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Resumo: 
Having a strong position in Brazil, Globo managers decided to export its most 
relevant cultural products, telenovelas. Due to cultural and linguistic proximity, 
Portugal was a natural market. Indeed, Globo's telenovelas have hooked 
Portuguese audiences since the late 1970s. However, in recent years, Globo's 
role in Portugal has been far more comprehensive. Globo's business strategies 
have been imported by the Portuguese commercial channel, Sociedade 
Independente de Comunicação (SIC). With Globo's expertise, namely in the 
area of programming, SIC managed to become the number one channel in 
terms of audiences. Thirty years on, and despite obvious differences, the result 
of Globo's assistance to SIC might be seen as a re-export of the US commercial 
television model. 
 
The re-export of the US commercial television model 
 
 Time-Life/Globo/SIC:  
Replicating Business Strategies? 
 
 
Paper delivered to the Political Economy Section of the Scientific Conference of 
the International Association for Mass Communication Research, Glasgow, 25-
30 July 1998. 
 
The implementation and successful commercial development of Globo 
Network in Brazil was made possible by the transfer of capital, technical and 
managerial expertise from the US Time-Life group. The agreement in the 1960s 
between these two groups was crucial because, in a short period of time, Globo 
acquired entrepreneurial know-how used by the most advanced US commercial 
TV stations. In five years - from 1962 up to 1967 - Globo became the dominant 
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actor in the Brazilian broadcasting scene. Having a strong position in Brazil, 
Globo managers decided to export its most relevant cultural products, 
telenovelas. Due to cultural and linguistic proximity, Portugal was a natural 
market. Indeed, Globo's telenovelas have hooked Portuguese audiences since 
the late 1970s. However, in recent years, Globo's role in Portugal has been far 
more comprehensive. Globo's business strategies have been imported by the 
Portuguese commercial channel, Sociedade Independente de Comunicação 
(SIC). With Globo's expertise, namely in the area of programming, SIC managed 
to become the number one channel in terms of audiences. Thirty years on, and 
despite obvious differences, the result of Globo's assistance to SIC might be seen 




'If we are speaking of television in Brazil, that 
necessarily means we are speaking of Globo' (Lima, 
1990:35). 
Globo - run by the Marinho family - is today one of the most powerful 
multi-media groups. Though Roberto Marinho (in his 90s) built up a 
conglomerate of nearly 100 companies, the most important ones in the 
communications arena are Globo's own ten television stations and 68 affiliated 
stations, Globo's Radio network (11 own stations and 15 affiliated), O Globo  
newspaper (the second largest paper in the country), Globo News Agency, 
Globo Publishing, Sigla audio producer, Globo Video and Globo Films (Lima, 
1990:36).  
According to João Roberto Marinho, Vice-president of Globo 
enterprises and son of Roberto Marinho, 'the Globo network reaches today a 
potential market of 33 million households with TV, and the network reaches 
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97% of the Brazilian territory' (quoted in Mayblin, 1996:8). The TBI Yearbook 96 
claims that TV Globo currently attracts 65% of the country's viewing audience. 
This figure is nevertheless disputed by João Roberto Marinho who states that 
the figure is 70% (Ibid.). The remainder 30% is divided between five national, 
privately run services - São Paulo based SBT, TV Manchete in Rio de Janeiro 
and the former regional stations TV Record, Bandeirantes, and CNT - and one 
publicly owned broadcaster. 
Literature about Globo often portraits it as being the world's fourth 
largest network in terms of audience size. The 'fourth largest in the world' 
which is still taken for granted was established when TV Globo won an 
international award in the US in 1985. At that time research showed that Globo 
was the fourth biggest network in the world after the American NBC, ABC and 
CBS. Since then no research had been conducted to find out if that is still the 
case. But, in terms of audience size, things might have changed. 'Both India's 
and China's state TV network monopolies, for instance, now command 
audiences several times larger than Brazil's Globo network, not only because 
they are monopolies but also because of the sheer size of their respective 
population (Mayblin, 1996:9). 
Being or not the 'fourth largest in the world', Globo gets most of Brazil's 
US$3.9 billion expenditure a year in advertising (Kucinski, 1994:52). The Globo 
network absorbs about 80% of advertising for television and 60% of the total 
amount of money spent on advertising in the seventh largest advertising 
market in the world (Amaral and Guimarães, 1994:29). In the 1992 financial 
statement, the Roberto Marinho group declared just over US$2 billion net 
revenue (Kucinski, 1994:52). 
TV Globo's commercial success has certainly been related with its 
intimate relationship with the political and economic power. As Guimarães and 
Amaral point out, the broadcasting monopoly was not constructed on the 
margins of state, but in its shadow, with the support and protection of the 
successive military regimes. Its consolidation took place under the patronage of 
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the New Republic and the Collor government was key. After securing the 
private system with public investment and a technological infrastructure 
owned by the state, the military governments singled out one of the private 
systems, the Globo network, as their favoured. The military's choice was 
confirmed by the next civilian government, even though this meant that the 
government would refrain from enforcing even the minimal existing regulatory 
legislation (1994:32). 
The relationship between the media business and national politics in 
Brazil could hardly be closer. Indeed, Roberto Marinho makes no excuse for 
supporting those in power given that without their permission, Globo could not 
operate in its present form. 'As long as the political power remains strong, we 
will show solidarity with it; if things change towards public opinion, we will 
change as well' (Marinho quoted in Diário de Lisboa, 30 July 1984). 
 
Globo's US Partner 
Without the support of the domestic political and economic elite over 
the past decades, Globo Television would not have become a virtual 
broadcasting monopoly in Brazil. Still, in the early beginnings, Globo had a 
crucial ally - the American Time-Life group. In no more than five years - from 
the Globo's Television foundation on the 28th of June 1962 up until 1969 when 
Time-Life shares were bought by Roberto Marinho - Globo became a highly 
sophisticated broadcasting company. 
Roberto Marinho secured the first radio broadcasting license from 
President Juscelino Kubitscheck in 1957. But television broadcasting was also on 
his mind and it is believed that by late 1950s Roberto Marinho already had 
business contacts with Time-Life. From February to May 1959 O Globo 
newspaper gave special attention to the diplomatic career of Mrs Claire Luce, 
the wife of Henry Luce, the Head of Time-Life (v. Herz, 1991: 97-100). This 
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sympathetic reporting suggests an obvious interest in co-operating with the US 
media group in the television broadcasting arena. 
Time-Life was looking for a partnership in Brazil. Both O Estado de São 
Paulo and the Dailies and Associated Radio Chains refused Time-Life 
partnership offers. Indeed, acceptance of a foreign partnership would be 
unconstitutional. The Brazilian Constitution forbade foreign companies from 
owning and participating in the administration or intellectual orientation of a 
domestic broadcasting  company. Given the close relationship between Roberto 
Marinho and influential political actors, Globo managed to circumvent the law. 
It was in the government's interest to develop a television network which 
would be prepared to 'unite' the country around its prospect economic and 
industrial reforms. 
'Time-Life needed a way to enter the market, and Globo needed money 
and assistance: there were all the ingredients for a perfect plot, written and 
directed by a local media baron financed by a multinational as the executive 
producer, with the military an appreciative audience conveniently ignoring the 
unconstitutional nature of the arrangement' (Mader, 1993 quoted in Mayblin, 
1996:12).  
Indeed, on the 24th July 1962, the recently created Globo TV Ltd firmed 
in New York two contracts with Time-Life. The general points of the agreement 
were set out by the Contrato Principal and the minutiae was presented in the 
Acordo de Assistência Técnica. These two contracts were prepared by Luiz 
Gonzaga do Nascimento Silva, a stern advocate of Globo's interests with 
privileged access to the Brazilian ambassador in the US, Roberto Campos. 
According to Herz (1991), even before the signature of partnership contracts, 
Globo received US$ 1,5 million from Time-Life Inc. 
The Contrato Principal established a number of responsibilities for both 
Globo and Time-Life. On the one hand, it was up to Globo to buy the necessary 
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television equipment and to build Globo's headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. The 
building and the studios would have to be operational by the 1st July 1963. 
On the other hand, Time-Life had the following responsibilities: 
a) To give technical assistance in the television arena. 
b) To receive and train Globo's personnel in its facilities. 
c) To exchange information and data of administrative and commercial 
nature. 
d) To provide engineering assistance and consultancy in matters such as 
design, construction and operation of television studios and equipment. 
e) To provide guidance concerning the acquisition of films and foreign 
programmes. 
f) To provide financial contribution. 
(Contrato Principal, 1962) 
The Contrato Principal also clarifies that Time would receive 30% of 
Globo TV's profits. In order to have full control of the company's finances, the 
contract states that all Globo balance sheets would have to be checked and 
approved by Ernest & Ernest on a monthly basis. Ernest & Ernest should have 
free access to all of Globo's book-keeping and archives. Furthermore, Time itself 
would be free to visit and inspect any part of Globo TV's facilities, examine 
accounts and archives, and discuss with employees whenever it wished. This 
contract, expected to last 11 years, would be broken by Time if, for  any reason, 
Roberto Marinho and his wife ended up having less than 51% of the shares. 
Given the unconstitutional character of the arrangement, and despite 
the obvious contradiction, Roberto Marinho's lawyer included the following 
declaration in the contract: 'Time's financial contribution to  Globo does not 
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mean that Time has any right to Globo shares nor has it the right to directly or 
indirectly interfere in Globo's management' (Contrato Principal, 1992: point 5a). 
The Contrato de Assistência Técnica established between Globo and 
Time-Life group was signed in the very same day of the Contrato Principal (24 
July 1962). Still, whereas the Contrato Principal was signed with Time-Life 
Broadcast International, Inc., the Contrato de Assistência Técnica was signed 
with Time Inc. This option was an attempt to disguise the potential impact of 
one US company in Globo's affairs. 
The grounds on which the technical assistance contract is based are 
related to the experience Time has - through its subsidiaries - in radio and 
television. The contract refers the considerable technical, artistic and 
commercial experience of Time in commercial television and says that Globo 
wishes to benefit from this experience and know-how. 
Therefore, the most relevant aspects of the technical assistance Time 
was supposed to give Globo were: 
a) Time shall give assistance in administrative procedures providing 
information concerning modern company business strategies, and new 
techniques related to programming, news services and activities of public 
interest, sales, promotion and advertising, financial control, budgeting, 
engineering and technical guidance specifically related to the building and 
equipment. Time shall also give assistance in determining the number and 
responsibilities of TV Globo employees, and more generally, it will assist in 
commercial, technical and administrative aspects of the setting and running up 
of TV Globo. In order to organize this assistance, Time will send a consultant 
(with the professional profile of an executive director) to Rio de Janeiro for as 
long as Globo wishes. Furthermore, Time will send a qualified accountant who 
shall be working full time as an Assistant to the Head of TV Globo. 
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b) Time shall train, in all television specialities, all the personnel Globo 
wishes to. This training will be done in various Time television stations as well 
as in Time's headquarters in New York. 
c) As long as it is required by Globo, Time will train Globo's staff in TV 
Globo headquarters in Rio de Janeiro. 
d) Whenever necessary, Time will provide guidance and will assist TV 
Globo in terms of acquisition of the broadcasting material and in terms of 
negotiation techniques with actors and personalities. This guidance is not only 
related to the financial aspects of the negotiations and techniques but also to the 
artistic value of the products and actors. In special occasions, Time will assist 
TV Globo in the sale of commercials space, and visits to New York advertising 
agencies.  (Contrato de Assistência Técnica ,1962) 
This contract includes a number of aspects, besides the so-called 
technical assistance. It establishes the value of TV Globo payments to Time by 
its services, the deadlines and means of payment, and states that the contract 
should last for 10 years, being automatically renewed. 
These contracts were not dead letter. Indeed, Globo was 
assisted/controlled by Time-Life group at all levels. Time-Life's representative 
in Globo, Joseph Wallach (formerly director of Time-Life's TV station in 
California) became a de facto Globo's executive director. Moreover, US 
technicians taught Globo staff in Rio de Janeiro and Globo's employees did 
travel to the US in order to acquire know-how in several areas. 
But, in addition to administrative, technical, commercial and artistic 
know-how, the Brazilian television station (later network) received an estimate 
US$6 million from Time-Life group between 1962 and 1966 (Herz, 1996:193). 
Both money and assistance were understood as unconstitutional and unfair by 
other TV stations operating within the law. Globo was in an advantageous 
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position comparing with existing media organizations and, therefore, it 
managed to lay a solid foundation to its future development. 
'The Time-Life agreement was fundamental for two sets of reasons: 
firstly, because there was a substantial influx of capital which was 
indispensable to the setting up of a highly competitive TV station; secondly, it 
enabled Globo to develop a commercial television similar to the most advanced 
US television networks' (Filho in Bolãno, 1988: 87). A member of the first Globo 
team, Herbert Fiúza, says that the team has worked within the parameters 
established by the Americans. 'Globo was inspired in WFBM, an Indianapolis 
station. The engineer from that station did most of the work, we did not know a 
thing' (in Bolãno, 1991: 88). Apart from the technical aspects, Globo staff in 
general did not have any training in television. So, it comes as no surprise that 
they were keen to learn from Time's experience in the sector. 
So, following Time-Life's advice and expertise, Globo established itself 
as a successful commercial TV network. By 1969, Globo's business orientation 
plus its uncompromising struggle for audiences shook the market and 
transformed Globo into the number one television in Brazil. Rival television 
networks, such as Tupi and Excelsior, had no financial means nor human 
resources to fight Globo's increasing dominance and were closed down. In the 
1970s, Globo became the regime's network. The military not only invested in 
the expansion of Globo's network but also gave Globo the government's official 
advertising accounts. 
Although, the Globo/Time-Life agreement officially terminated in 1969 
- following an intricate parliamentary investigation (see Herz, 1991) - Globo's 
foundation had been laid, and US experts continued working for Globo. Joseph 
Wallace, for instance, remained effectively as an executive director up until 1980 
(Herz, 1991: 142). 
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Beyond Brazil 
 
With the support of Time-Life, Globo established itself as the Brazilian 
television model. Having a dominant position in the domestic market, Globo 
started considering the export of its cultural products, mainly telenovelas. In 
the 1970s, Globo's executives perceived the export of its products as a 'prestige 
factor' rather than as a revenue source. Given that telenovelas  were made for 
the domestic market, its export implied practically no additional costs. Any 
extra-funds it could generate would be well received but, in the early stages of 
internationalisation, profits from the external market were expected to be kept 
low. 
At that time, two external markets stood up as the 'natural' markets for 
Globo's telenovelas: the Latin American market considering that most Latin 
American countries were at the time strong producers and consumers of the 
telenovela genre, and the Portuguese market due to its cultural and linguistic 
proximity. 
The export to Latin American countries would be more demanding as it 
would involve promotion, distribution and the dubbing to Spanish. Apart from 
that, in Latin America, Globo already had a strong competitor in terms of 
production and distribution of telenovelas: the Mexican television network, 
Televisa. In contrast, Globo would not have any competitor in Portugal and 
there would be no need to make any linguistic adaptation. Therefore, Portugal 
became the first external market for Globo's telenovelas. In 1976, Globo sold 
Gabriela to the Portuguese Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) company, 
Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP). Its success was remarkable: 'Globo was 
surprised with the success of its products in Portugal', says the executive 
Director of Globo, Pedro Carvalho (interview with author, 24 April 1998). 
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One year later, Globo set up an international division to support the 
export of telenovelas to Latin America. As expected, Globo's penetration in the 
Latin American market was not easy particularly due to Televisa's competition. 
But their strategy was very aggressive as an executive from the international 
division explained. 'To enter and win this market we had to face Televisa which 
produces 26 hours of Spanish programmes per day (...). Still we have been able 
to sell our products, adding dubbing costs, 50% cheaper than Televisa's. How? 
Using what I called 'drugs strategy': first you practically give, wait for success 
and later you sell for the best price' (quoted in Grael and Rocha, 1988:143). 
The telenovela's popularity in the Portuguese market made Globo's 
executives consider further expansion into the European market in the early 
1980s. Globo started promoting its products in specialised international 
magazines. Presenting itself as 'Globo TV Network of Brazil', the corporation 
was prepared to sell not only telenovelas but also mini-series, talk shows and 
sports programmes. Globo became a constant presence in international 
television festivals and markets (e.g. Monte Carlo festival, London Multimedia 
market, NAPTE, organized by the National Associated TV Program Executives, 
in the US, etc.). Furthermore, Globo became highly competitive in terms of 
international televisions awards. These awards were important to promote the 
product (Grael and Rocha, 1988:143-4). 
Orders from Latin American countries were dealt with by the 
International Division in Rio de Janeiro. The New York office distributed 
Globo's products in the US and Canada while the Roma office received orders 
from Europe, with the exception of Portugal. RTP negotiated directly at board 
level in Globo's headquarters in Rio de Janeiro (Grael and Rocha, 1988:144). By 
the mid-1980's Globo not only retained its leading position in the Brazilian 
television market but it was exporting its cultural products to 128 countries 
(Melo, 1988:39). Globo's telenovelas, in particular, are galvanising audiences in 
Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia. 
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If the export of programmes was relatively risk-free, the same cannot be 
said about direct investment in a foreign company. In 1985, Globo exported, for 
the first time, capital to Europe, buying 90% of Telemontecarlo. The 
headquarters of the company was in Monte Carlo and its potential audience 
was in Italy and part of France. The initial investment was of US$9 million but 
additional capital was needed, among other things, to improve the reception of 
the television signal in Italy. 
With the acquisition of Telemontecarlo, Globo expected to strengthen 
its position in the European market  and 'to develop an European television 
network' (Louven quoted in Grael and Rocha, 1988:149). This was however a 
very unsuccessful venture and in 1994 Globo decided to sell its remaining 
shares. It is believed that Globo suffered huge losses with this undertaking, 
though the company has never revealed figures.  Amongst the reasons to leave 
Telemontecarlo, Globo mentions the European economic recession and the fall 
of the Italian lira in relation to the US dollar (Diário de Notícias, 16 January 
1994). This failed investment had repercussion in Globo's future investment 
strategy. 
 
Globo's first step in Portugal 
 
Portugal was indeed a 'natural' export market for Globo's products. 
Apart from the non-existence of a linguistic barrier, there has always been a 
strong cultural affinity between both countries. This means that popular 
television products in Brazil generally become popular in Portugal. 'The 
audience patterns in Brazil coincide with the audience patterns in Portugal. 
Furthermore, the preferences of the Portuguese people are getting closer and 
closer to those of the Brazilian people', says Geraldo Casé, artistic director of 
Globo's International Division (quoted in O Jornal, Suplemento, 20 May 1988). 
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In both Lusophone countries, telenovelas are the most widely watched 
television programmes. 
In the beginning however telenovelas  were a truly difference product 
for the Portuguese public. Gabriela, Cravo e Canela, an adaptation of a Jorge 
Amado's novel, was the first telenovela to be broadcast in Portugal by the PSB 
company, RTP. The first episode went on the air on the 16th of May 1977 and 
soon became highly successful. People were actually changing their life style so 
they could watch the programme. This massive popularity was not foreseen 
and surprised the people involved in the process. 'RTP was very conservative. 
With the exception of the BBC, no European channel was programming serials. 
So, I was hesitant in terms of introducing changes in prime time', states Carlos 
Cruz, RTP's Programme Director at the time (quoted in Expresso, 17 May 1997). 
Indeed, it was Globo itself that first approached RTP with a proposal to 
acquire its products. Carlos Cruz says that he ended up doing the very first 
negotiation with Globo by mere accident. He happened to be in that position 
when Globo tried to sell Gabriela to RTP. Still, Carlos Cruz believes that the 
development of this relation was 'inevitable' (in Expresso, 17 May 1997). Once 
the floodgate had been opened, Globo substantially intensified the export of 
telenovelas to RTP. O Casarão, Astro, Escrava Isaura and  Dancin' Days  
followed Gabriela, all beating audience records, with no competition either 
from other Brazilian TV networks or from Portuguese producers. 
From 1977 up until 1987, Globo sold 19 telenovelas to RTPi. After one 
decade of monopoly, Globo had to face competition from other Brazilian 
television networks. Manchete and Bandeirantes started exporting telenovelas 
and mini-series, though the vast majority of novelas continued to be Globo's 
products. Globo's telenovelas were perceived as being those with higher quality 
and the network had already strong links with RTP. 
On a comparatively smaller scale, Portuguese companies also started to 
produce telenovelas: in 1982, Edipim produced the first one, Vila Faia; in 1985 
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RTP produced Chuva na Areia; in 1987, Estúdios Atlântida produced Palavras 
Cruzadas. Overall, less than a dozen telenovelas were produced by Portuguese 
companies. Still, these 'domestic' products represent an effort to 'fight the ultra-
dependency on Brazilian telenovelas', as Carneiroii puts it (quoted in Sousa, 
1996:210). Indeed, soon after the first Brazilian novelas were on the air, fears of 
'reverse colonization' have been expressed by the Portuguese cultural elites. The 
Portuguese telenovelas - in itself a repercussion of Brazilian telenovelas - were 
an attempt to counter-balance the Brazilian predominance. 
But, neither Portuguese telenovelas nor other Brazilian networks' 
telenovelas could effectively compete with Globo (Pantanal from Manchete being 
an exception). Globo increased considerably the export of novelas to RTP 
throughout the years. During the first decade, Globo was exporting an average 
of three per year while by 1986/87 this figure had duplicated. Guaranteeing 
audiences, Globo's telenovelas became, in the 1990's, a trump card fiercely 
disputed between the traditional PSB company, RTP, and the newly created 
private TV channels, SIC and Televisão Independente (TVI)iii. 
With the break up of RTP's monopoly in 1992 and the subsequent 
ferocious battle for audiences, telenovelas became even more dominant in 
television programming. The demand was so intense that companies had to 
look for other content providers rather than Globo. TVI acquired novelas from 
Bandeirantes, Serviço Brasileiro de Televisão, TV Cultura (all Brazilian 
networks), Televisa (Mexico) and Venevision (Venezuela). In January 1995, for 
instance, TVI was programming three Venezuelan telenovelas (dubbed into 
Brazilian-Portuguese) per day and one Brazilian in prime time. Lacking 
financialiv and human resources, TVI could not compete with RTP and SIC in 
terms of getting Globo's products and/or technical support. 
Being more resourceful than TVI, RTP has been able to afford Brazilian 
telenovelas  which are perceived as having more quality. In RTP's generalist 
channel, RTP 1, telenovelas are indeed a constant presence. In January 1995, this 
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channel was broadcasting two telenovelas in the morning, one in the afternoon 
and the most popular one (usually the most recent) around 8.30 pm. 
For SIC too, Brazilian telenovelas  are the most important programming 
aspect of its highly competitive strategy. It was mainly with telenovelas that SIC 
managed to overtake RTP 1 in terms of audiences, being today the most 
watched TV channel in the country. Considering also January 1995, as we did 
for the other channels, SIC broadcast two novelas in the morning, one in the 
afternoon and two in the evening.  Great importance is given to the selection of 
the last two telenovelas (before and after the main news bulletin of the day). 
 In contrast with a number of Latin American countries, Portugal 
produces a very small number of series or movies, being therefore dependent 
on foreign products. Brazilian telenovelas in general, and those of Globo in 
particular, are crucial to the sustenance of bulky audiences. Watching 
telenovelas  clearly became an ingrained habit of the Portuguese people. 
The cultural and social consequences of 20 years of telenovelas in 
Portuguese TV have not yet been thoroughly studied. Nevertheless, a number 
of signals are already observable. Brazilian expressions entered into people's 
vocabulary, Brazilian first names are quite popular, novela's actors and 
actresses fashion accessories are imitated, 'Brazilian-style' Carnival is 
'reproduced' in a substantial number of towns. There is also a common sense 
perception that telenovelas had an important role in terms of liberalizing social 
behaviour.  
 
SIC's Brazilian Partner 
In the 1990's, the influence of Globo in Portugal has spread to other 
spheres beyond the export of telenovelas. The opening up of the television 
market in the early 1990's provided Globo with the opportunity to acquire a 
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solid position in Portugal and, indeed, its strategy adapted to the new 
competitive environment. 
Once the Television Act (law nº58/90) was passed and the bidding 
regulations approved, on the 2nd April 1991, three Portuguese candidates 
applied for the two available national TV channels: Sociedade Independente de 
Comunicação (SIC) led by former prime-minister, Pinto Balsemão; TV1 Rede 
Independente, chaired by Proença de Carvalho with the support of the Carlos 
Barbosa media group (Presslivre), and Televisão Independente (TVI), close to 
the Catholic Church. Even before the results were publicly announced, Globo 
had invested in SIC the very maximum allowed by law to a foreign 
participation (15%). At that time, 15% of SIC's capital represented US$34m. 
Currently, as the companies' capital increased, 15% represents US$74m. 
Though SIC was an expected winner in the bidding process, investing 
capital in a Portuguese broadcasting company was not an easy decision for 
Globo's executives to make. For Globo, it has always been safer to export 
cultural products because, once investment had been recouped in the home 
market, selling telenovelas, mini-series and other shows could only mean extra-
funds. Investing capital in a Portuguese broadcaster was inevitably a risky 
business. The licence-fee had been abolished and four national TV channels 
(RTP 1, RTP 2, SIC and TVI) were preparing themselves to fight for a small 
adverting cake (£160m) (Sousa, 1996: 4). Additionally, in the early 1990's, the 
first (and by then only) European Globo's experience in terms of capital 
investment, Telemontecarlo, was already in serious trouble. Telemontecarlo had 
been, in fact, a poorly judged manoeuvre and investing capital in the 
Portuguese market was therefore not in Roberto Marinho's plans. Not prepared 
to waist anymore financial resources, Roberto Marinho (father) resisted to the 
idea for quite sometime. 
Still, Roberto Marinho's son, Roberto Irineu Marinho, responsible for 
the Audiovisual and New Markets, and Pinto Balsemão himself, ended up 
convincing Globo's chairman that SIC would be a solid investment. Having 
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failed with the first European market (Italy), Roberto Irineu might have also 
wanted to prove his father that successful investment in Europe was possible. 
Pinto Balsemão took the task of convincing the Brazilians personally 
and travelled to Rio de Janeiro to secure the investment and the 
technical/human support that SIC so badly needed. 'I was recently in Brazil 
and dr. Roberto Marinho offered a dinner in my honour at his home. Amongst 
the 30 guests were the most important Globo's executives. I had meetings with 
these executives for two days and I discussed issues such as equipment, 
commercial difficulties and the profile of Globo's representative in SIC's board' 
(quoted in O Independente, 24 May 1991). 
The personal relationship between Pinto Balsemão and Roberto 
Marinho was a determining factor in terms of Globo's investment in SIC. 
According to SIC's Marketing Director, Correia Pires, there are affinities 
between both which probably made their talks easier: 'both started their careers 
as journalists and both worked in newspapers; both developed multi-media 
strategies and, coincidentally, their first television experiences were developed 
when they were middle-aged men; apart from that and, although in different 
forms, both have been involved in politics' (interview with author, 26 May 
1997). 
All efforts were made to convince Roberto Marinho because Globo was 
perceived by SIC's executives as an ideal strategic partner. Firstly, Globo had 
'the' perfect products in terms of audiences, telenovelas; secondly, Globo had 
managerial and technical experience; thirdly, any help they could provide 
would not be impaired by linguistic barriers. Following initial unsteady talks, 
the Marinho family finally reached a consensus and decided to invest 
financially in SIC and to provide assistance. 
Globo's backing was particularly important right after the disclosure of 
the winners of the television channels' bidding process. On the 6th of February 
1992, after a Cabinet meeting, the ministro Marques Mendes announced that 
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SIC had won one of the two national television licenses. From that moment up 
until the beginning of SIC's regular broadcasts, on the 6th of October 1992, 
Globo's expertise was crucial. Neither Balsemão nor his most trusted 
collaborator, Emídio Rangel, had any previous experience in television. Two 
thirds of newly recruited journalists had never faced a camera and, in a country 
where RTP operated in a monopoly, there were not too many places where SIC 
could recruit its technicians from. As Globo's executive director, Pedro 
Carvalho, so bluntly put it: 'SIC was a group of entrepreneurs willing to be in 
the television business, knowing nothing about television' (interview with 
author, 24 April 1998). 
According to Pedro Carvalho, it was not however in Globo's plans to set 
up a Globo-style television in Portugal. 'We did precisely that in Italy with 
Telemontecarlo. We got there and we set up a Globo TV. But we paid an heavy 
price for that strategy. Telemontecarlo was a terrible experience because at that 
time we did not understand that television is local entertainment, done by 
locals' (Ibid.). Globo managers were well aware that they could not replicate 
Globo in Portugal. 'Had we imposed our model in Portugal, it would not have 
worked', argues Pedro Carvalho (Ibid.)  
However, Globo being - in SIC executives' eyes - a model commercial 
television, its managers travelled to Brazil in order to understand how their 
counterparts were organized and how the company performed. Pinto 
Balsemão, President of the board, and Emídio Rangel, Programmes and 
Information Director, made numerous working trips to Globo. 'Emídio Rangel 
had a radiophonic view of television. I introduced him to Boni (a top Globo's 
strategist) and in five minutes Rangel changed his mind', says Pedro Carvalho, 
himself the Vice-President of SIC's administrative board and the Vice-president 
of SIC's executive board. 
Pedro Carvalho is a man of confidence of Roberto Marinho and has a 
strong position in SIC. Although he dismisses his importance, referring that he 
is one in ten members of SIC's board, his opinions are seriously taken and his 
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influence in SIC's implementation and successful commercial strategy should 
not be underestimated. In fact, it comes as no surprise Pinto Balsemão's 
admission that there is an 'intimate' relationship between Globo and SIC: 'They 
have given us plenty of advice, we tried to follow it, and so far it has been very 
fruitful' (quoted in Sousa, 1996:207). To SIC's chairman, this privileged 
relationship is only natural since Globo is a shareholder and it has a member 
sitting on SIC's administrative board. Pedro Carvalho travels frequently to 
Portugal and he does not miss monthly board meetings. Basically he co-
ordinates all linkages between Globo and SIC. 
Even considering that SIC is not a mere imitation of Globo, SIC has 
learnt from Globo on several areas. In terms of programming, SIC's strategy - 
just like Globo's - is unconditionally designed to maximise audiences. 'The core 
of a programming strategist activity is to secure maximum audience loyalty', 
points out Pedro Carvalho (interview with author, 24 April 1998). Both Globo's 
and SIC's managers know that programming strategies have to consider the 
cultural/social context of audiences. So, and despite cultural proximity between 
Portugal and Brazil, it is Emídio Rangel who selects Globo's products for SIC 
and schedules them. 'Emídio Rangel is today as good as any of our 
programming strategists with the added bonus of having the Portuguese eye', 
says Pedro Carvalho (Ibid.). Notwithstanding initial trips to Brazil to learn 
about Globo's organization and logic, Emídio Rangel makes two annual trips in 
order to choose the most adequate Globo products to Portuguese audiences 
(Carvalho, Ibid.). 
Following the lead of top management, SIC's middle-management has 
also been prepared to learn from Globo. SIC's Marketing Director and 
Comercial Director were trained in Globo where they made professional 
internships (Correia Pires, fax message, 5 June 1997). In Pedro Carvalho's 
words, all SIC's directors (e.g. Programming, Production, Commercial, 
Marketing, Technical, Financial) were in Globo at least once, but some travel to 
Brazil more frequently (interview with author, 24 April 1998).  
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Globo's technical department has also provided crucial know-how to 
the newly created TV station. It has provided expertise in terms of selection of 
equipment and human resources. SIC's technicians have travelled to Brazil to 
develop their expertise and Globo's experts have come to Lisbon to provide 
their services at SIC's studios. Beyond engineering and the selection of human 
resources, Globo has also been very important in terms of defining SIC's image. 
SIC's logo and image was developed by Globo's graphic designer, Hans Donner 
(Correia Pires, fax message, 5 June 1997). 
Globo's management strategy and technical expertise has, in fact, been 
essential to the setting up of SIC and to the development of so far winning 
tactics. But, it is still as a 'content provider' that Globo is most desired. Since the 
beginning of Globo's co-operation with SIC, its executives have always 
expressed their aspiration to have the exclusive of Globo's telenovelas. This was 
not an easy option for Globo because RTP had been, for many years, one of 
Globo's best clients and there had always been a courteous and professional 
relation between both companies. 
For two years, Globo sold telenovelas to both RTP and SIC. So, Globo's 
products were actually competing with each other during prime time and 
dividing audiences. SIC argued that this was not the best strategy for Globo 
itself as telenovelas' actors were over-exposed (often same actors were on the 
air simultaneously in two channels interpreting different roles). Basically, SIC's 
management argued that fragmenting audiences with Globo's own products 
was not sustainable in the long term. Firstly because telenovelas' image would 
deteriorate and, secondly, because currently Globo produces an average of nine 
novelas per annum, and - at present levels -  that would not be enough for two 
channels (RTP 1v and SIC). It followed the 'natural' conclusion that if Globo had 
to contribute to the commercial success of one channel only, that would be the 
one where its money was. 
In September 1994, after initial resistance, Globo signs an exclusivity 
contract with SIC. This contract, which became effective from January 1995, was 
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a very serious blow to RTP.  RTP's generalist channel (RTP 1) was already 
having problems to keep its audiences and the consequences of this contract 
were predictable. By mid-1995, mainly due to Globo's telenovelas and expertise, 
SIC became the most watched TV channel in the country. In 1996, the four most 
watched TV programmes amongst terrestrial channels, were four Globo's 
telenovelas exhibited by SIC. 
 
Conclusions 
There are obvious differences between the Time-Life/Globo agreement 
and the Globo/SIC agreement. In the first case, it was the US group which was 
looking for foreign business opportunities; in the second case, it was the newly 
created company, SIC, which was looking for an ideal strategic partner. Globo 
was not particularly interested in investing in a Portuguese broadcasting 
company, once the domestic adverting market was knowingly small for four 
national channels depending almost exclusively on advertising revenues. 
The political/legal circumstances in which these agreements were 
established were also completely different. Thirty years ago, Brazil lived a 
highly volatile situation and the arrangements between Time-Life and Globo 
were not developed within the existing legal framework. On the contrary, when 
Globo and SIC developed their relationship, in the 1990s, there was no political 
instability in Portugal, and the legality of the arrangements was not an issue. 
Still, the support of Time-Life to Globo was crucial at that time. And the 
support of Globo has also been of the highest importance to SIC. In the early 
stages of both Globo and SIC, the companies' managers and staff had no 
television experience, so they were keen to learn from more experienced 
broadcasting companies. Globo's assistance to SIC appears to have a more 
informal character but clearly its staff was also eager to learn with their 
successful partners. 
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With money and assistance from Time-Life, it took Globo few years to 
reach the number one position in the Brazilian broadcasting arena. Similarly, 
having followed Globo's managerial 'advice' and buying its products, SIC 
became, in a short period of time, the number one in terms of audiences and the 
most financially balanced TV channel in Portugal. 
In any case, Globo did not 'impose' its expertise or products. In fact, it 
did not have to because SIC managers and staff recognized that they had no 
experience in the field and they were well aware that Globo would be a crucial 
content provider. Furthermore, Globo did not want to set up a Globo-style 
station because it has had that experience and it has not worked out. Globo 
managers understand that a successful television has to take the national 
cultural and social context into consideration. After their reluctant entry in the 
Portuguese television market, Globo's main objective in Portugal was to assist 
SIC in winning the audience battle and, for that, a Portuguese eye - as Pedro 
Carvalho puts it - was essential. 
In addition to the notorious relevance of Globo in SIC's management 
and programming strategy, Globo's commercial television model - originally 
based on the US commercial television model - has had an impact in the overall 
television system. Given the financial hardship the other television stations 
have to deal with, they have been convinced that their best alternative is to 
imitate SIC. This being the case, Globo's presence in the Portuguese television 
market shaped, to a certain extent, the overall domestic television scenario. 
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iGabriela, Casarão, Astro, Escrava Isaura, Dancin' Days, Sinhazinha Flô, Dona Xepa, Água Viva, 
Olhai os Lírios do Campo, Baila Comigo, Cabocla, Pai Herói, O Bem Amado, Guerra dos Sexos, 
Rabo de Saia, A Sucessora, Louco Amor, Corpo a Corpo, Vereda Tropical. 
iiRoberto Carneiro is a former chairman of the private national TV channel, Televisão 
Independente de Comunicação, TVI. 
iiiRTP operated in monopoly until the 6th of October 1996, when the first national private 
channel, SIC, started broadcasting. On the 20th of February 1993, a second national TV channel, 
TVI went on the air. So, presently there are four national terrestrial TV channels: RTP 1, RTP 2, 
SIC and TVI. 
ivTVI has only 10% of the television advertising cake. 
vAlthough RTP has two channels, only RTP 1 (the generalist channel) broadcasts Brazilian 
telenovelas. 
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